Nelson: Response to Comstock

If the idea of autonomy is readily accessible, some
of its complexities lie pretty close to the surface as well:
Even without blatant force or fraud, how free are we
real1y to choose and act on those choices? What is the
bearing of our environment and our genetic heritage on
what we wish and what we do? Can such influences be
resisted? To what extent is the viability of autonomy
as a moral notion dependent on human life's not being
determined by causal regularities?
Most moral examinations of autonomy proceed as
though there were satisfactory answers to these
questions in place, and to a large extent, this is true of
this symposium as well. It is more directly to the present
point to sketch out the lines of another dispute: How
and why is autonomy morally significant at all?
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Autonomy has been one of the most crucial concepts
in moral philosophy since the Enlightenment; it has been
equal1y important in the forms of moral practice that
have developed during that time, in particular, in the
drive for more democratic social structures. And its
importance hasn't flagged, in either theory or practice,
in our culture's most recent reflections about the nature
and demands of ethics. But at the same time it is a
highly contentious concept, both in terms of how it
should be understood, and of its implications for how
we ought to live our lives. In these remarks I will
establish a context designed to underscore both the
continuing significance and the continuing controversy
·surrounding autonomy.

The Significance of Autonomy:
Views from Moral Theory
There are two major positions on this issue. Some
thinkers regard autonomy as morally significant
intrinsically. The most uncompromising proponent of
this view historical1y is probably Immanuel Kant, who
regarded the possession of autonomy as essential for
having any moral standing at all; once possessed it has
an overriding impact on the ways that one should be
treated. As Kant would have it, an autonomous being
is a person, and persons ought never be treated solely
as means to ends but always as "ends in themselves."
Kant saw any being or action that was not autonomous,
but simply a part of the closed, causally detennined
system of Nature, as without moral worth. Nonhuman
animals, therefore, are without any direct moral standing
for Kant, although we do need to take care about how
our treatment of animals might influence our behavior
toward other persons. Contemporary philosophers
influenced by Kant do not necessarily follow him in
denying any moral standing to nonautonomous beings
or actions, but they tend to agree that autonomy is crucial
to the possession of moral rights.
The tradition in moral theory more heavily indebted
to John Stuart Mill-utilitarianism-regards autonomy
as important not in itself, but because of its important
contributions to what is important in itself. If, for
instance, one takes happiness to be the only things that
is an intrinsic good, then autonomy is morally important
just to the extent that honoring it leads to greater
happiness. Mill and others have argued that respecting
the autonomy of human beings is strongly conducive

The Idea of Autonomy: A Rough Characterization
A "smooth" characterization of autonomy would
require a great deal of space to work out and defend,
and would still be subject to disagreement. But the
conceptual neighborhood autonomy occupies can be
indicated fairly succinctly: Autonomy involves the
notion of being free to choose one's own values and
actions. This is a familiar idea, and one whose moral
importance is fairly apparent, at least in our time and
place: We feel the loss of something very important if
we are deprived of our liberty. If our choices or actions
are manipulated by the force or the deception of others,
we tend to feel as though our importance as persons is
too cheaply regarded.

DISCUSSION

Between the Species

34

Winter 1992

Nelson: Response to Comstock

A good deal ofcontemporary health care, for example,
is directed toward the no-longer autonomous, the not-yet
autonomous, those who will never be autonomous, and
those of diminished autonomy. Many medical ethicists
maintain that an autonomous person's "moral advantage,
is restricted to her being (in general) an authoritative
source of information concerning her values, and hence,
an authoritative decision-maker. Those who lack
autonomy cannot occupy that role, but there is an equal
moral obligation to tailor treatment decisions to the
patient's values, not those of her caregivers; the trick, of
course, is to determine what those values are.
Many feminist theorists have in recent years expressed
real concern about the logical, causal, and metaphorical
implications of autonomy, or at least of certain
understandings of the notion. They are suspicious that
an ethic centered on autonomy presents a too highly
individualized picture of moral relationships-at least,
too highly individualized to accurately represent the moral
situations characteristic of women-and that a focus on
autonomy tends to discourage taking proper moral
account of the value of concern and connectedness, of
compassion and care.
And finally, the animal liberation movement has
contributed to reconsiderations of both autonomy's
range and its importance. It has explored the
implications of the fact that nonhumans have strong
preferences and can make choices reflecting them. Also,
along with feminist theorists and medical ethicists,
philosophers interested in animals have suggested that
autonomy may need to be taken down a peg or two as a
determinant of moral standing.
It is this second theme that Professor Comstock explores
in his paper. Fixing on a particular analysis ofautonomythat provided by R. G. Frey-he attempts to demonstrate
that a human life may fail to be autonomous in that sense,
yet be worthy of moral respect and protection. He suggests
further that some of the moral qualities we respect in his
exemplar, a woman named Carrie, may be due to her very
lack of autonomy, as Frey canceives of it The implication
of Professor Comstock's paper is clear: If a human being
needn't possess autonomy for her life to be considered
with moral respect, there is no justification for regarding
autonomy as the secular analog to the traditional notion
of an immortal soul-the "bright line" separating humans
from nonhumans that allows us to manipulate and end
animal lives with impunity.
Professor Francis' commentary raises questions
about whether Comstock's understanding ofautonomy

to happiness, for an adult can be generally presumed to
know her own interests better than others will, and
because, as noted earlier, being coerced by others, even
if their motivation is benevolent, typically makes us
very unhappy.
It is worth noting that because this tradition in moral
theory sees traits other than autonomy as ethically
important, it is often more hospitable to nonhuman
animals (on the widely shared assumption that the
relevant senses of autonomy do not apply to
nonhumans).
Both broad concepts of autonomy have been
influential in recent movements of moral reform, with
interesting results for both our moral practice, and our
moral understanding.

The Significance of Autonomy:
Views from Contemporary Social Movements
The idea of autonomy has played a major role in many
of the social practices that have recently undergone rapid
and significant change. Three social movementspatients' rights, the women's movement, and the
movement to liberate animals-are particularly
instructive.
In health care, both legal and moral theory, followed
(to some extent) by clinical practice, have moved
decisively away from the paternalistic idea that "doctor
knows best" about the kind of health care decisions that
ought to be made for a patient, and toward the notion
that the free and informed consent of patients is a basic
requisite for acceptable medical interactions. A parallel
shift seems to lie at the heart of the women's movement;
it has rejected the idea that women's lives and choices
should be determined by a patriarchal system that
subordinates their interests to those of men. Similarly,
many animal liberationists have insisted that we
abandon the notion that animals are simply there for
our use, even if we avoid cruelty in our dealings with
them. Animals have lives of their own, on this view,
and aren't just means to our ends.
All this is clearly a movement in the direction of
greater respect for the autonomy of patients, of women,
and of nonhumans. But while appeal to the moral
importance of respecting autonomy has figured
importantly in these and other movements for moral
change, all three have yielded problems and insights
that have made the concept of autonomy seem even
more complex and problematic.
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Professor Frey* has many reservations about
Comstock's analysis-he is not convinced, for instance,
that Carrie's life is bereft of autonomy in the same way
that the lives of nonhumans are-but his main objection
is that his position has been misconstrued. As a
utilitarian, he does not assign to autonomy any kind of
"trump card" status. Possessing autonomy does not
guarantee the inviolability of one's life or other interests
against sufficiently important competing interests. Nor
does lacking it render a being without moral value.
All these essays inspire reflection on how to refine
our understanding of autonomy, and on why it is morally
important. Such activity is a genuine contribution to
moral discourse about the place of nonhumans in a
secular, pluralistic society.

is overly individualistic, linking the notion too closely
to "a rejection of background and tradition." She also
suggests that Carrie's life might well be enhanced were
both she and others to have a greater respect for her
autonomy, and ends by claiming that line drawing is
not the appropriate metaphor for sorting out the moral
complexities of intraspecific ethics.
Professor Sapontzis, like Comstock, reads Frey as
asserting that autonomy is a crucially important
determinant of a being's moral standing, but can find
no justification for assigning it such an overweening
status. As Sapontzis sees it, valorizing autonomy is a
result of either logical errors, or of arbitrarily insisting
that the preferences of a subclass of human beings ought
to be a universally valid standard of moral worth.
Furthermore, even were Frey able to show that
possessing autonomy did confer on human beings
"moral superiority," it would not follow that humans
had the right to exploit and kill nonhumans.

* Professor Frey's commentary, presented at the
March, 1990 Society for the Study of Ethics and
Animals meeting, was not available for publication.

Pigs are the breath of the mud,
the bristly warmth of tough skin,
the outcome of ovals and curves.
Pigs are earth movers,
rooting for what is buriedphilosophers' stones, sapphires, goldwhich things pigs know are found
with the worms, the grubs, and the snails.
Pigs love life,
the touching of snouts,
the squealing of throats,
the unimportance of eyes.
Susan J. Armstrong
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